Philosophy Paper

Former Guilford philosophy professor Tom Powell had this to say about the following paper, which was written for a sophomore-level course in social and political philosophy:

"The organization is extremely effective, beginning with a focused and specific statement of the issue and a clear, non-trivial, but brief recapitulation of the position taken by Rawls. She proceeds naturally--seemingly effortlessly--through the most important considerations of the issue, and her own conclusions are restrained and qualified.

Stylistic point: the cadence of her prose is energetic and modulated by effective variations of sentence length and complexity."

Powell concludes by noting that the spelling and grammar are near flawless.

A concluding note: this paper, like the two preceding it, is an analysis. Note, however, how much more restrained--as Powell describes the paper's conclusions--the style is, particularly in terms of word choice and imagery. The author proceeds carefully, thoughtfully. Nevertheless, despite the absence of the sort of stylistic experimentation we would expect in the two previous writing situations, this paper is characterized by a consistent personal voice that is both authoritative and fair-minded, assertive yet engaging.

Rationality in Rawls' A Theory of Justice

Rationality, a word scattered generously throughout Rawls' A Theory of Justice, is a concept to be examined from three different angles in relation to the theory. The requirements a person must meet in order to qualify as a rational person in the original position must be questioned. The rationality behind the choices such a person would make in the original position must be questioned. Most importantly, the rationality of the theory itself (and, more specifically, of the original position) must quite definitely be questioned.

1) Who is rational?

Rawls seems to believe that a rational person is a person who is able to make deliberative choices on the basis of all information available to him. This rational person is able to determine the probability of consequences. Envy is not going to enter the picture with regard to the choices he makes in the original position. He will not regret the decisions he has made, nor will he be held accountable for the goodness or the badness of those decisions, as (again) he has made them on the basis of all available information. This rational person has the freedom to make decisions. He has a general and universal idea of what justice is and he can be completely confident that the other people involved in his decision-making in the original position are also rational and are also capable of determining what is just. He is recognized as equal to these others (his rights are protected as such a person in the constraints put upon the original position) and he is expected to recognize the equality of the others. He knows what goods are considered basic human goods and he makes choices based on the idea that he, as a human, desires these goods as his ends. He is absolutely required to abide by the principles established in the original position as he has had a part in their establishment and it is assumed that what has been decided is what he desires. He will, of course, seek to advance his own ends as much as possible in making his choices.

Although in most ways, Rawls's idea of the original position and the veil of ignorance seems to work for him in that it is able to avoid coming to terms with problems of the rationality of the theory itself, in examining the rationality of the actual parties involved, it occasionally seems to be, if not self-defeating, at least inconsistent and thoroughly confusing. For example, a very basic stipulation for being a rational person is that you must be able to determine probability of outcome, probability that the choices you make will actually work toward the ends you seek. How, though, could anyone be expected to predict outcome if he is unable to base his judgment on what has happened in the past? Even if a person is aware of what human beings are inclined to do in given situations, if he is not given any knowledge of history, personal or otherwise, he is not going to have any concrete detailed descriptions of how they have indeed reacted. It would not be rational to repeat the failures in judgment that history has revealed. Human goods may always have been the same, but obviously some attempts to obtain those goods have simply not worked. It would be rational to repeat that which has proved to be successful.

The idea that a rational person will not feel regret for the decisions he has made is also injured by the veil of ignorance. No, I cannot reasonably regret that which I have agreed to on the basis of all available information, but yes, it is quite rational for me to regret that decision once I am outside the original position realizing things about my situation and the situation of others which might have caused me to make a different decision. In other words, no, I cannot regret making the decision I made because I did not know any better, but yes I can regret not having made another decision because now that I am outside the original position I do know better.

How a person obtains the kind of clone-like quality he has in relation to the rest of the people in the original position with regard to equality of rationality and ability to respond in identical ways is also something to be questioned. Outside the original position, we are most certainly not on the same level of rationality. How does the original position account for people who are not mentally capable of making rational decisions, such as people who are brain dead, people who cannot retain memory of necessary information (that information which is allowed under the veil of ignorance), people who are simply ignorant of the necessary information (what if I know nothing about the social sciences, for instance?), or people who do not make decisions consistently when given different situations dealing with the same kinds of principles? It is a fact that there are many people who exist in this world who do not conform to Rawls's idea of what rationality is. Does his original position then rationalize people? Does it remove their handicaps, educate them, and change them in such a way that they will all react in the same ways and be convinced by the same arguments (something which Rawls claims is true of rational people on)? Also, does it take away their ability to react and to make choices on the basis of the tiny peculiarities of personality which they possess as individuals, those things that would not count as knowledge not allowed behind the veil of ignorance, but which would be considered inherent determining factors in their tendencies to choose in a certain manner? For example, why is a rational person unable to feel envy in the original position? Of course I cannot know how lacking my state of existence is compared to the others' in the original position, but I do not see any reason why I cannot envy while in the original position. If I naturally envy and hunger for attention, would it be impossible for me to refuse to agree with the decision being made in order to draw attention to myself? In other words, would it be impossible for natural irrationalities to follow me into the original position and to work their way into the way in which I make my decisions? One would have to question the rationality of something like the original position if it requires that people be made rational before issues of justice are even addressed.

If I am a rational person, why would I enter into the original position in the first place.

By definition a rational person seeks to advance his own ends. By definition he is able to recognize probability and he knows what goods are accepted as basic human goods. Would it not, then, be utterly irrational for a rational person to enter into a decision-making situation if he knows that the people entering into that situation with him do not share his idea of what is a good and will make a decision which has the quality of finality and which is based on the acceptance of these goods as basic human goods? For example, I belong to a society which is trying to decide what the national flower will be. I like daisies, but I know that what is commonly accepted as good is the iris. Why would I enter into the original position with a group of people who I know will choose the iris as the national flower? Why would I go behind the veil of ignorance knowing that I will forget that I like daisies and will be led to believe that I, like "all other" human beings, recognize irises as being good, then once outside the original position again, be forced to recognize the iris as the national flower? I know that I will not be furthering my own cause (which is rational) by entering the original position, so why should I be expected to do it?

Even the idea of going into the original position seeking the greatest possible degree of liberty is tainted by this. It is true enough that even if I want absolutely no liberty I should attempt to gain as much as possible once under the veil of ignorance since I can always give it away. However, if I am rational before I enter and I recognize that the people with whom I will be making this decision all accept liberty as a basic human good and will claim it for themselves and for everyone else in the society once outside the original position, why should I enter, knowing that there will be no one to give my liberty away to once we are all back in society?

Or, on the other hand, what if all of us actually do want the same thing when we enter the original position? For example, what if I belong to a society in which each member wants to give away his money to help needy people to the extent that he himself starves to death? I am the neediest person in the society. I hate money, will not accept it when it is offered to me, and really desire starvation. Everyone else in my society feels the same way. It is proposed that we enter into the original position to decide what should be done with the society's money. If I realize that the basic human good which will be recognized here is that money should be given to the neediest people and I know that I will not want to take the money and will not be able to give it away once outside the original position, why should I enter into it in the first place?

Of course, there is always the possibility that Rawls means to say that a person is not aware that he will go behind the veil of ignorance when he steps outside his society to make his decision. He may not know anything about what the original position will be like at all. In that case, it would not be at all irrational for him to enter into the original position, even if he is completely aware that his idea of what is good is in conflict with what the rest of the society accepts as basic human good.

Rational choice

Rawls presents three principles for making rational choices. The first of these is the principle of effective means, which states that, "we are to adopt that alternative which realizes the end in the best way. More fully: given the objective, one is to achieve it with the least expenditure of means (whatever they are); or given the means, one is to fulfill the objective to the fullest possible extent." Again, the veil of ignorance throws a wrench into this principle to some extent. The questionable words here are "best" and "least." I am quite able to understand why, in the original position, it would be perfectly feasible for me to make a rational choice which did realize my end, but to substantiate the claim that I have the kind of information that would provide a sturdy enough base to say that my choice is in fact going to realize that end in the "best" way is impossible. Of course, it is never possible, even given all information available in the world, to state what will actually realize the end in the best way, but certain types of knowledge not allowed under the veil of ignorance would be helpful in at least making a rational prediction. Going back to the idea of knowledge of history as necessary, for instance, it is irrational that I should be denied access to information about principles established in the past to further ends similar or identical to mine which may or may not have achieved to the fullest extent possible those desired ends. If past efforts have failed, it is vital for me to know that my effort may also fail, and that I should either alter my principle or choose another. An idea that has fascinated me with regard to this concept of the veil of ignorance is that it would be possible, if all human beings share the same idea of human good, for every society in the world to ruin itself economically and politically to the extent that no other society could come to its aid, by choosing faulty principles in the original position identical to those chosen by every other society.

The word "least" (expenditure of means) also is hurt by this idea. How can I know what will actually cost me the least if I have no idea what little unanticipated problems might arise and put extra strain on my means? To know what kind of expenditures have accompanied plans of action similar to mine might cause me to follow a completely different plan. I think of decision-making as being highly dependent upon example. To take away such a vital part of the foundation of our making rational choices is in itself irrational.

To pass over the second principle of rational choice momentarily, the third relates directly to this concept of denial of the details of history from the participants of the original position. The third principle, that of the greater likelihood of realization of ends, again comes in conflict with the idea of rationality when placed in the context of the veil of ignorance. How can we determine any sort of substantial likelihood when our rational powers of prediction are so severely stunted by the veil of ignorance's theft of our knowledge of what happened before us? Or, even if we can determine the likelihood of a principle's achieving our ends based on certain truths we are to assume about human beings and how they operate, what is the sense, what is the rationality, of being denied this information when we could possibly keep from making a decision which was made in the past, was likely to achieve its end, and did not?

There seems to be little need to take issue with the second principle of rational choice if it is given that it is possible to adequately deliberate toward an effective and likely end within the original position. This second principle states that, "one (short-term) plan is to be preferred to another if its execution would achieve all of the desired aims of the other plan and one or more further aims in addition." Of course I will choose one plan of action over another if it will offer me all that the other can give, plus extra benefits. That is common sense. That is rational.

Two general questions concerning the rationality of the theory

Is it rational to bind people to the decisions they have made in the original position? For a theory which supposedly strives to eliminate the neglect of individual rights in utilitarian theory, A Theory of Justice does very little to protect the individual person, at least if that person possesses deviant perceptions of what is basically good for human beings and desirable for himself. If I have eccentric ideas of basic human good, Rawls will "rationalize" me away from what I indeed want by placing me behind the veil of ignorance. Then he will make me believe that I want what everyone else wants and I will make a decision on the basis of this deception. Once I am outside the original position, Rawls will tell me I must abide by what has been decided because I had a hand in deciding it. Did I freely and rationally decide, though?

Is it rational to put the restriction of finality on the principles created in the original position? It seems that this could only be justifiable if the society could enter into the original position from the time of the first meeting to eternity and consistently decide upon the same principles. I think that something which comes into play here, though, is the fact that of the two obvious determining factors of original position decisions, knowledge of basic truths about human beings through the social sciences and knowledge of basic human goods, the latter will probably remain the same while the former progresses. As we move forward in time, we necessarily gain more and more insight as to what a human being is and how he operates. Although details of history will never be allowed into the information to which we have access behind the veil of ignorance, their accompanying social implications might possibly be included in that information, and the existence of such a variable in this particular thought experiment could have a definite impact on the resulting decisions.

The original position as a categorical imperative

In questioning the rationality of Rawls' theory, it is easy to lapse into criticism of the impossibility of the original position. Rawls cleverly avoids most claims against the rationality of different aspects of the original position by admitting that it is, after all, a political ideal. Still, I would take issue with the idea that this political ideal does not need to find some way to fit into our logical, rational way of carrying out political theory. Like Plato's defining the structure of the republic on the "Myth of the Metals," a lie, Rawls bases his theory of how human beings arrive at principles which ensure justice on a imaginary and impossible state of being, also a lie. Is this in itself rational? More importantly, is Rawls justified in bringing the idea of rationality into his theory at all, emphasizing it so often and intermingling it with the impossible restrictions he puts on participants in the original position? I see him rationalizing us in order that we might create principles, which he crams back into a less than perfect, largely irrational society which cannot fully and realistically accept them. Saying that our only purpose here is to work toward what we see as that political ideal simply does not satisfy me. To take the liberty of making so many claims about human rationality, Rawls should be able to give us something which we can follow as rational beings in our full capacity to choose. In other words, he needs to present us with a theory which allows us to be rational beings under terms which we are able to recognize as both rational and attainable.

In his defense, it must be said that it is highly unlikely that a theory could be developed which would obliterate in a realistic manner what we consider to be irrational injfluences on our ability to choose. In working toward a Kantian categorical imperative in his original position, he strives to eliminate those conditions which he sees as barriers to the making of choices on the basis of what we accept as just and good for all human beings. He attempts to drive from his theory as much human irrationality (in the form of specific individual influences on choice) as possible, in order that we might, in a Kantian sense, base our decisions on the things which demonstrate the elements of our universal rationality, those things which link us together as rational beings, and give us a way to approach justice on common ground.

Reference

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.

-- Laurel Nesbitt

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